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Dear Mr. Epstein:
Your article in the Spring, 1984,
issue of Law School Record,
"Settlement and Litigation: Of
Vices Individual and Institutional"
is an excellent analysis of many of
the problems literally clogging our
litigation system. The Michigan
Supreme Court has been involved in
rewriting the Michigan Court Rules,
last revised in 1963, and I have
critiqued the proposed new rules for
some of the very same reasons you
are critical of modern procedure. I
am in the unique position of seeing
every piece of premises, property,
products liability, wrongful deten­
tion, and other public liability litiga­
tion filed against this corporation
each year. I continue to handle liti­
gation in our local county while
supervising it around the country
and have become acutely aware of
the general practice of using proce­
dural rules to harass settlement in
marginal and non-liability cases.
I have sent a copy of the article to
the clerk of the Michigan Supreme
Court and commended it to his
office and to the justices of the
court as worth reading.
C. Bruce Taylor, J.D. '66
Attorney, Public Liability
K Mart Corporation
Troy, Michigan
Dear Editor:
Continuing a colloquy we began in
first year Contracts, I should like to
respond to Professor Epstein's
article on "Settlement and Litiga­
tion" in the Spring 1984 issue.
Both as a Quaker, and as a Legal
Services attorney often without
funds to conduct adequate dis­
covery, I wholeheartedly agree with
the article's concern to promote in­
formal settlement where prolonged
and expensive litigation is not in the
public interest.
However, one critical sub-thesis
of the article appears to me over­
simplified, namely, the contention
that litigiousness has been uselessly
fostered by the erosion of tradition­
al "bright line" rules that he claims
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structure both primary behavior and
litigation. In place of such per se
rules based on overt behavior, Pro­
fessor Epstein argues, there has
been a rise of substantive tests that
turn either on the reasonableness of
conduct or the motive of the parties,
with a concomitant increase. in the
frequency and severity of litigation.
The article gives examples from
several areas of substantive law
about which I do not know enough
to comment. I shall comment on
one example, the erosion of the
"termination at will" doctrine that
where employment is for an indefi­
nite period an employee may be dis­
charged at any time and for any rea­
son.
There is no doubt that this rule is
in process of erosion. I believe that
in most if not all Western industrial­
ized nations the tendency is to
require an employer to demonstrate
good cause before an employee may
be legally terminated.
This new rule, as it becomes
fixed, will be just as "bright" and
just as easy for potential litigants to
understand so as to calculate their
conduct accordingly, as is the bright
line rule of termination at will that it
replaces.
The difference is that the old rule
has come to be perceived as unfair
to employees, a variant of Anatole
France's remark that the law in its
majesty permits rich and poor alike
to sleep under bridges. Thus the old
rule is being changed for the sake of
what Professor Epstein terms the
"social good." Yet if Professor
Epstein were to be heeded, all bright
line rules expressing unjust social
relationships would tend to be cast
in concrete for all time, or at least
until a legislature was prepared to
replace the old bright line rule with a
new one.
What is happening in the area of
employment contracts is the com­
mon law process whereby society
feels its way from one bright line
rule to another by way of an inter­
mediate period of experimentation
and, necessarily, uncertainty. I sus­
pect that Professor Epstein and I
would agree that this is a process of
social change often preferable to
legislative fiat.
Staughton Lynd, J.D. '76
Northeast Ohio Legal Services
Youngstown, Ohio
Mr. Epstein replies:
To Mr. Taylor, I can say only that
I am glad what I have written strikes
a responsive chord in someone who
is on the firing line of day-to-day
litigation.
My response to Mr. Lynd must be
a bit more extensive. The critical
error in his letter is the failure to dis­
tinguish between the transitional
costs incurred in switching from one
legal rule to another, and the costs
of a given legal rule once it is
adopted. Mr. Lynd sensibly urges
that the costs of transition are in this
instance not sufficient to prevent the
abrogation of the at-will rule.
Nonetheless, Mr. Lynd's point
misconceives my central argument,
which was that even if the transi­
tional costs in switching from the at­
will rule were zero, for-cause em­
ployment contracts should not be
required as a matter of law. The at­
will rule should be retained because
typically it best responds to the
demands of both sides to the con­
tract at the time of formation. Both
sides share the gain in a rule that
operates with little judicial discre­
tion and with low administrative
costs. Both sides have under the at­
will contract the ability to vary the
level of payment of services, and in
the limit to quit or to fire. In most
cases these unilateral sanctions pro­
vide a far more effective safeguard
against abuse, whether by employer
or employee, than the elaborate and
multi-faceted inquiry that any
wrongful discharge rule must neces­
sarily spawn.
The contract at-will cannot be dis­
credited by showing that it will yield
abuses in individual cases; every
legal rule has that failing. Instead, it
must be shown that the level of
abuse in private markets is so high
as to justify the enormous costs (in­
cluding those associated with
employee abuse of the new legal
system) that the cumbersome, state
imposed wrongful discharge rules
necessarily entail. It is this burden
that advocates of wrongful dis­
charge, including Mr. Lynd, wholly
fail to carry. (I have given a more
detailed analysis of my position in
an article, "In Defense of the Con­
tract at Will," that will appear in
the Fall 1984 issue of the University
ojChicago Law Review.) •
